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What do we know about gender, women, peace and security? In the past two decades, interest in 
systematic data and research on gender, women, peace and security has increased substantially. 
This growth has helped bring traditional feminist research themes into the mainstream fold 
of political science and international relations, offering opportunities to analyse and answer a 
number of policy-relevant questions. Some policy-makers welcome this growing research: for 
example, to mark the 15 year anniversary of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 in 2015, a 
high-level review produced the report Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace: 
A Global Study on UNSC Resolution 1325.1 In her 2017 annual award speech at the Georgetown 
University Institute for Women, Peace, and Security, Secretary Clinton referenced studies 
that demonstrated that when women are included in peace negotiations the resulting 
agreements are less likely to fail.2 Similarly, the Council on Foreign Relations (CfR) has 
an interactive website dedicated to women’s role in peace processes that reiterates these 
claims, which first originated from an influential 2012 UN Women publication on women’s 
participation in peace negotiations.3 These examples illustrate the growing recognition 
and use of systematic analyses regarding gender, women, peace and security.
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Notwithstanding recent positive 
developments, these examples also 
illustrate problems in how we use data 
and which data we use. For example, 
scholars criticise the Global Study 
for not systematically compiling or 
collecting existing empirical research 
to substantiate its claims.4 There has 
been similar pushback on the claims 
promoted by CfR, arguing that there is a 
lack of evidence.5 The current simplistic 
approach to data is problematic for two 
primary reasons: (1) effective policies 
require a factual foundation, not merely 
good intentions; and (2) a lack of 
transparency undermines research and 
ultimately enables sceptics to dismiss 
the important normative issues of 
women’s inclusion and gender equality 
more broadly based on concerns over the 
empirics. This is particularly unfortunate 
because data and systematic research on 
different aspects of gendered inequality, 
gendered forms of violence, women’s role 
in armed groups, and the implementation 
of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) 
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agenda have improved greatly in quality 
and quantity. 
Scholars who engage in these quantitative 
projects are usually familiar with 
existing datasets and quickly learn 
about new data projects through formal 
and informal channels. However, the 
wider community of researchers, and 
particularly those within the policy realm, 
are frequently unaware of the most 
recent projects and developments. This 
has hampered efforts to shape policy 
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2based on systematic data collection and 
analysis on gender, women, peace and 
security, and provided policy-makers 
with cover for their lack of political 
will to implement effective policies. 
This article therefore aims to provide 
a short overview of the known knowns 
and known unknowns of the quantitative 
data landscape on gendered violence, 
women in armed groups, and the WPS 
agenda. I begin by discussing data on 
societal gendered violence, highlighting 
both advances and areas for further 
improvement, before turning to discuss 
data on sexual violence, exploitation, and 
abuse in conflict settings. The second 
part of this paper examines what we know 
about women’s participation in armed 
groups, before I briefly discuss what 
we know about women’s participation 
in national militaries. In the section on 
the Women, Peace, and Security nexus I 
provide an overview of the quantitative 
data on issues linked to UN Security 
Council Resolution 1325, such as gender 
mainstreaming, National Action Plans, 
and increasing women’s participation in 
different aspects of peace processes, 
in particular peacekeeping, negotiations, 
and peace agreements. Lastly, I use this 
survey of the current state of the field to 
recommend future directions of study 
and policy initiatives. 
DATA ON GENDERED 
VIOLENCE
Gendered inequality as violence
Feminist scholars have argued for 
decades that gendered (in-)equality is 
crucial to understanding international 
relations, conflict, and violence.6 A 
fundamental pillar of the argument is that 
gendered inequality, or put differently, 
the domination and exploitation that 
disadvantages women and benefits men, 
is in itself a form of violence. Building on this 
theoretical foundation, positivist scholars 
attempted to find conceptualisations and 
measurements to model the effects of 
gendered (in)equality on conflict from 
likelihood of onset to severity.7 Although 
this body of work finds consistent 
support for the hypothesised causal 
relationship between gendered inequality 
and conflict, it faces criticism. 
One criticism is that scholars use the 
same data to essentially test three 
different theories about how gendered 
inequality influences conflict: (1) Micro-level 
violence against women and girls reflects 
societal norms that normalise other 
forms of violence, (2) women’s exclusion 
from positions of power enables men 
to sustain “warrior” gender roles, which 
limit the government’s strategic thinking 
and increase the likelihood of armed 
conflict, and (3) rigid gender dichotomies 
that tie masculinity to the warrior ideal 
and femininity to nurturing mother ideal 
perpetuate identities and behavior that 
entrench men’s belligerence and women’s 
lack of power.8 This lack of theoretical 
clarity is reflected in the empirical sphere 
where different indicators such as fertility 
rate, women’s labor market participation, 
and women’s political representation are 
used interchangeably.9
In light of these theoretical and 
methodological challenges, recent projects 
aim to be more comprehensive in both 
conceptualising and measuring gendered 
inequality. For example, the WomanStats 
project includes 350 variables in 175 
countries, including previously neglected 
aspects such as sex trafficking, family law, 
and women’s participation in government 
and militaries.10 A unique feature of the 
WomanStats project is its to attention 
on women’s security, which distinguishes 
it from other data projects such as the 
Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI) Human 
Rights Data Project, which has an index 
for women’s economic, political, and 
social rights, but not for experiences 
of violence.11 Besides the WomanStats 
project there are a number of indices 
that are targeted at policy-makers.12 A 
recent addition is the WPS Index created 
1 UN Women, Preventing 
Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the 
Peace: A Global Study on the Implementation of 
the United Nations Security Council Resolution 
1325 (New York, NY: UN Women, 2015) http://
wps.unwomen.org/pdf/en/GlobalStudy_EN_
Web.pdf
2 Katie Reilly, “Read Hillary Clinton’s Georgetown 
Speech on Women’s Role in Peace and 
Politics”, Time, 31 March 2017, http://time.
com/4721094/hillary-clinton-georgetown-
transcript/
3 Council on Foreign Relations, “Women’s 
Participation in Peace Processes”, Council 
on Foreign Relations, accessed 9 October 
2018, https://www.cfr.org/interactive/
interactive/womens-participation-in-peace-
processes#Introduction
4 Theodora-Ismene Gizelis and Louise Olsson, 
“The Production of the Global Study: What’s in 
a Measurement?” in The Oxford Handbook of 
Women, Peace and Security, ed. Sara E. Davies 
and Jacqui True (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2018).
5 Christoph Zuerchner, “Tangible Evidence or 
Wishful Thinking?”, CEPI-CIPS, 20 August 2018, 
http://www.cepi-cips.ca/2018/08/20/tangible-
evidence-or-wishful-thinking/
6 J. Ann Tickner, Gender in International 
Relations. Feminist Perspectives on Achieving 
Global Security (New York, NY: Columbia 
University Press, 1992); Cynthia Enloe, 
Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist 
Sense of International Politics, 2nd ed. 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 
2014).
7 Mary Caprioli, “Gendered Conflict”, Journal 
of Peace Research 37 (1) (2000): 53-68; 
Mary Caprioli, “Gender Equality and State 
Aggression: The Impact of Domestic 
Gender Equality on State First Use of Force”, 
International Interactions 29 (3) (2003): 195-214; 
Mary Caprioli, “Primed for Violence: The Role 
of Gender Inequality in Predicting Internal 
Conflict”, International Studies Quarterly 49 
(2) (2005): 161-78; Mary Caprioli and Mark 
A Boyer, “Gender, Violence, and International 
Crisis”, Journal of Conflict Resolution 45 (4) 
(2001): 503-18; Erik Melander, “Gender Equality 
and Intrastate Armed Conflict”, International 
Studies Quarterly 49 (4) (2005): 695-714; Dan 
Reiter, “The Positivist Study of Gender and 
International Relations”, Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 59 (7) (2015): 1301-26.
8 Sabrina Karim and Danny Hill, “The Study of 
Gender and Women in Cross-National Political 
Science Research: Rethinking Concepts and 
Measurement”, working paper presented at the 
Annual Convention of the International Studies 
Association, San Francisco (2018).
9 Gizelis and Olsson, “The Production of the 
Global Study: What’s in a Measurement?”
10 Mary Caprioli et al, “The WomanStats Project 
Database: Advancing an Empirical Research 
Agenda”, Journal of Peace Research 46 (6) 
(2009): 839-51.
11 David L. Cingranelli and David L. Richards, “The 
Cingranelli and Richards (CIRI) Human Rights 
Data Project”, Human Rights Quarterly 32 (2) 
(2010): 401-24.
by Georgetown University’s Institute 
for Women, Peace and Security in 
collaboration with the Peace Research 
Institute of Oslo. The index focuses on 
three dimensions of women’s position 
relative to men: inclusion, justice, and 
security. In calculating and ranking the 
153 country scores, the index draws on 
recognised data sources, including peer-
reviewed publications, national statistical 
offices, and UN organisations.13
These initiatives in data collection, 
however, are no cause for complacency. 
As promising as they might be, they share 
the same limitations: data availability, 
reliability, comparability, and robustness. 
Sex-disaggregated data are limited in 
their temporal scope. For example, one 
of the reasons that fertility rate data are 
frequently used in statistical analyses is 
that it is one of the few measures that are 
available from the 1960s onwards, while 
most sex-disaggregated data collection 
only started in 1990. As a result, 
recent projects such as WomanStats 
(earliest data available from 2007) or 
the WPS index (2017) are restricted to 
cross-sectional analyses and do not 
allow temporal analyses. The temporal 
dimension, however, is crucial if we are to 
accurately assess the changing situation 
of women across and within countries. 
A recent working paper by Sabrina Karim 
and Danny Hill14 offers an approach that 
largely overcomes temporal limitations 
of data availability without falling into the 
theoretical pitfall of blending together 
variables that reflect different behaviours 
and different inequalities, and thus do 
not actually capture one underlying 
concept. Theoretically, they disaggregate 
the overarching concept of gendered 
inequality into three dimensions: women’s 
security, women’s inclusion, and women’s 
rights. Methodologically, they draw on 
Bayesian mixed factor analytical models, 
which allow for and impute missing 
values in the component indicators. 
“Mixed models” means they combine 
both continuous and binary indicators 
“by assuming different functional forms 
for the relationships between the latent 
variable and the observed indicators”.15 
This approach enables them to draw 
on a multitude of sources and to 
cover an extensive time period (1960-
2014 for security and rights, 1973-2014 
for inclusion). Furthermore, unlike other 
indicators of gendered inequality, their 
scales include estimates of uncertainty, 
which guards them against overstating 
the precision of their conclusions. 
Sexual violence in armed conflict
Until recently, both political scientists 
and policy-makers had neglected or 
minimised sexual violence, deeming it 
a quasi-natural, inevitable occurrence in 
war. Recent research, however, illustrates 
that there is substantial variation in forms 
and severity of sexual violence in armed 
conflict.16 Wartime rape, for example, is 
best explained not by popular narratives 
of rape as a weapon of war, but by 
examining socialisation and group 
dynamics related to forcible recruitment.17 
Yet rape is not the only form of conflict-
related sexual violence; the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) further includes 
sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced 
pregnancy, and forced sterilisation/
abortion.18 Each form potentially speaks 
to different underlying motivations.  
To facilitate cross-sectional analyses, 
Dara Kay Cohen and Ragnhild Nordås 
introduced the Sexual Violence in Armed 
Conflict (SVAC) dataset in 2014.19 The 
SVAC dataset is the first systematic 
dataset on sexual violence in all active 
armed conflicts and first five inactive 
years between 1989 and 2009. It contains 
annual data based on three primary 
sources: United States State Department 
Human Rights Reports, Human Rights 
Watch reports, and Amnesty International 
reports. In addition to the five forms of 
sexual violence outlined by the ICC, the 
SVAC dataset also includes the forms 
12 Examples include: UNDP’s Gender Empowerment 
Measure (GEM) and its Gender-related 
Development Index (GDI), Social Watch’s 
Gender Equity Index (GEI), the OECD’s Social 
Institutions and Gender Index, The Economist’s 
Women’s Economic Opportunity Index (WEO), 
UNDP’s Gender Inequality Index, the World 
Economic Forum’s Gender Gap Index (GGI), 
the World Bank’s Gender Statistics Database, 
the Clinton Foundation’s “No Ceiling: The Full 
Participation Project”. 
13 Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and 
Security, “Georgetown University WPS Index”, 
Georgetown University WPS Index, accessed 20 
August 2018, https://giwps.georgetown.edu/
the-index/
14 Karim and Hill, “The Study of Gender and Women 
in Cross-National Political Science Research: 
Rethinking Concepts and Measurement”.
15 Ibid, 22.
16 Dara Kay Cohen, “Explaining Rape During Civil 
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American Political Science Review 107 (3) 
(2013): 461-77; Dara Kay Cohen, “Female 
Combatants and the Perpetration of Violence: 
Wartime Rape in the Sierra Leone Civil War”, 
World Politics 65 (3) (2013): 383-415; Dara Kay 
Cohen, Rape During Civil War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2016); Dara Kay Cohen, “The 
Ties That Bind: How Armed Groups Use Violence 
to Socialize Fighters”, Journal of Peace Research 
54 (5) (2017): 701-14; Dara Kay Cohen and 
Ragnhild Nordås, “Sexual Violence in Armed 
Conflict: Introducing the SVAC Dataset, 
1989-2009”, Journal of Peace Research 51 (3) 
(2014): 418–28; Dara Kay Cohen and Ragnhild 
Nordås, “Do States Delegate Shameful Violence 
to Militias? Patterns of Sexual Violence in Recent 
Armed Conflicts”, Journal of Conflict Resolution 
59 (5) (2015): 877-98; Elisabeth Jean Wood, 
“Variation in Sexual Violence During War”, Politics 
& Society 34 (3) (2006): 307-42; Elisabeth Jean 
Wood, “Armed Groups and Sexual Violence: 
When Is Wartime Rape Rare?”, Politics & Society 
37 (1) (2009): 131-61; Elisabeth Jean Wood, “Rape 
as a Practice of War: Toward a Typology of 
Political Violence”, Politics & Society, forthcoming, 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0032329218773710
17 Cohen, “Explaining Rape during Civil War”; 
Cohen, Rape During Civil War.
18 International Criminal Court, “International 
Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes, Article 8 
(2)(e)”, UN doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2, 2000, 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/
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19  Cohen and Nordås, “Sexual Violence in Armed 
Conflict”.
4“sexual mutilation” and “sexual torture”. 
The dataset distinguishes between 
conflict actors in each dyad: it includes 
information on state militaries, pro-
government militia, and rebel groups, and 
also provides details on other variables 
such as timing and location. 
The SVAC project has advanced a broad 
research agenda, exploring both the 
factors leading to sexual violence in 
armed conflict and the effects of such 
forms of violence. For example, one 
study using SVAC finds that shifts in 
the power relations between warring 
parties increase the likelihood of sexual 
violence.20 Examining the effects of 
sexual violence research finds that 
when rebels perpetrate sexual violence, 
mediation becomes more likely, and 
when both sides perpetrate sexual 
violence it increases the likelihood 
of conflicts ending in negotiated 
settlements.21 Others find patterns of 
UN and regional organisations deploying 
peacekeepers to conflicts in which sexual 
violence occurs.22 Forthcoming research 
examining peacekeepers’ impact on the 
perpetration of sexual violence finds that 
while strong mandates are not enough 
to mitigate sexual violence, missions 
with stronger police contingents have an 
advantage over other missions.23 These 
findings highlight the important and 
different roles that sexual violence plays 
in influencing conflict dynamics. 
At the same time, these findings also open 
up a number of new questions regarding 
the role of sexual violence. For example, 
are there other group-based factors 
besides forcible recruitment that can help 
us predict the use of sexual violence? 
What are the long-term consequences of 
sexual violence for societies and are they 
different from other types of violence? 
Two forthcoming datasets will be 
instrumental in exploring these and other 
questions. There is an update of SVAC 
forthcoming that will include the years 
from 2010 up to and including 2015. 
This update also serves as the template 
for the second forthcoming dataset, 
which further disaggregates forms of 
sexual violence.24 These datasets will 
further enable researchers to explore the 
potentially differing motivations and effects 
of different forms of sexual violence, as 
well as to start exploring the temporal 
effects of sexual violence. 
Sexual exploitation and abuse
In his most recent report on the topic, 
the UN Secretary-General António 
Guterres vowed that combatting sexual 
exploitation and abuse by peacekeeping 
personnel “continues to be one of [his] 
key priorities for 2018, as is assisting and 
empowering those who have been scarred 
by these egregious acts.”25 Despite the 
often proclaimed “zero tolerance policy” 
designed to prevent it, both civilian and 
military members of peacekeeping 
operations (PKOs) continue to perpetrate 
sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA).26 
How extensive is the problem? A recent 
survey-based study in Liberia estimates 
“that more than half of eighteen to thirty-
year-old women in greater Monrovia have 
engaged in transactional sex and that 
most of them (more than 75 per cent, or 
about 58,000 women) have done so with 
UN personnel, typically in exchange for 
money.”27 So what do existing data and 
research tell us about variation, possible 
explanations, and consequences of SEA? 
20 Karin Johansson and Mehwish Sarwari, “Sexual 
Violence and Biased Military Interventions 
in Civil Conflict”, Conflict Management and 
Peace Science, February 2017, https://doi.
org/10.1177/0738894216689814
21 Robert U. Nagel “Talking to the Shameless? 
Sexual Violence and Mediation in Intrastate 
Conflicts”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 
forthcoming.
22 Joakim Kreutz and Magda Cardenas, “Women, 
Peace and Intervention: How the International 
Community Responds to Sexual Violence in Civil 
Conflict,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 23, 
no. 3 (September 2, 2017): 260–76; Lisa Hultman 
and Karin Johansson, “Responding to Wartime 
Sexual Violence: UN Peacekeeping and the 
Protection Agenda,” Global Responsibility to 
Protect 9, no. 2 (2017): 129-146.
23 Karin Johansson and Lisa Hultman, “UN 
Peacekeeping and Protection from Sexual 
Violence”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 
forthcoming.
24 Logan Dumaine and Elisabeth Jean Wood, 
“Repertoires of Sexual Violence in Armed 
Conflict: Extending the SVAC Dataset,” 
unpublished article and dataset, n.d.
25 The UN Secretary-General defines sexual 
exploitation as “any actual or attempted abuse 
of a position of vulnerability, differential power, 
or trust, for sexual purposes, including, but not 
limited to, profiting monetarily, socially or 
politically from the sexual exploitation of another”, 
and “sexual abuse” as “the actual or threatened 
physical intrusion of a sexual nature, whether 
by force or under unequal or coercive conditions.” 
United Nations General Assembly, Special 
measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation 
and Abuse: Report of the Secretary-General, UN 
doc. A/72/751, 15 February 2018.  
26 Jasmine-Kim Westendorf, “WPS, CRSV and 
Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Peace 
Operations: Making Sense of the Missing 
Links”, LSE Women, Peace and Security Working 
Paper Series 9 (2017):1-14, http://eprints.lse.
ac.uk/85992/1/WP9_2017.pdf
27 Bernd Beber et al, “Peacekeeping, Compliance 
with International Norms, and Transactional 
Sex in Monrovia, Liberia”, International 
Organization 71 (1) (2017): 1-30.
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 These findings also open up a number of new questions 
regarding the role of sexual violence. For example, 
are there other group-based factors besides forcible 
recruitment that can help us predict the use of sexual 
violence? What are the long-term consequences of sexual 
violence for societies and are they different from other 
types of violence?
The first systematic analysis of SEA 
examined 36 international PKOs operated 
by the UN, NATO, ECOWAS, and the AU 
that were active between 1999 and 2010.28 
Ragnhild Nordås and Siri Rustad find 
that the greater the size of the troop 
contingent, the more likely it is that 
SEA will be reported. Low levels of SEA 
reporting are associated with missions in 
countries with higher levels of economic 
development. Higher levels of SEA 
reporting are associated with missions 
following conflicts in which there was 
extensive sexual violence. SEA reporting 
is more likely both when mission 
mandates explicitly mention women and 
when they take place after 2005. These 
latter two findings suggest that greater 
attention to issues of women’s security 
and SEA increases reporting. This 
underscores the inherent uncertainty 
associated with data on sexual violence, 
SEA, and WPS more generally. It highlights 
the difficulties in differentiating between 
increased prevalence and increased 
reporting, which pose problems for 
accurately assessing interventions’ 
outcomes and effectiveness. This presents 
a challenge for researchers, practitioners, 
and policy-makers alike: how do we know 
if an increase (or reduction) in reports is 
the result of reporting bias, a long-term 
trend, or a genuine reflection of changing 
patterns prompted by an intervention?  
A more recent study using mission-level 
information from 2009 to 2013 shifts 
the focus from structural conditions to 
the role of the mission composition.29 
Sabrina Karim and Kyle Beardsley find 
that both higher proportions of female 
peacekeepers and levels of gender 
equality in the sending country are 
associated with lower levels of reported 
SEA. Put differently, lower levels of SEA 
reporting are associated with PKOs with 
a greater share of women deployed. 
Further, lower levels of SEA reporting are 
associated with higher proportions of 
troops from countries with better records 
of gender equality. This suggests that 
while increasing the number of women 
may help, it falls short of addressing the 
underlying problem of inequitable power 
relations, and suggests that reducing 
SEA in PKOs requires all members of 
the mission to develop a fundamental 
regard for gender equality. In line with 
this, further research into mission-related 
factors finds that disciplinary culture 
and socialisation within a mission are 
associated with levels of reported SEA.30 
Specifically, Stephen Moncrief shows that 
higher numbers of non-sexual discipline 
offences are associated with higher 
levels of reported SEA. In other words, 
one potential avenue for addressing 
SEA is stricter enforcement of discipline 
in general and the cultivation of a value-
based organisational culture in PKOs.
Together, these studies shed light on 
the structural and organisational factors 
that are associated with SEA. The 
consequences of these acts, however, 
have been left largely unexplored so far. 
In his 2018 report, the UN Secretary-
General contends that “every allegation 
involving our personnel undermines the 
Organisation’s values and principles 
and the sacrifice of those who serve 
with pride and professionalism in some 
of the most dangerous places.”31 While 
there is little doubt that this true, the 
exact impact of SEA on UN missions’ 
credibility and the potential long-term 
effects on trust in the organisation and 
host countries’ governmental institutions 
requires systematic analyses. The 
Secretary-General also notes a further 
problem in that SEA “diverts attention 
28 Ragnhild Nordås and Siri C. A. Rustad, “Sexual 
Exploitation and Abuse by Peacekeepers: 
Understanding Variation”, International 
Interactions 39 (4) (2013): 511-34.
29 Sabrina Karim and Kyle Beardsley, “Explaining 
Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Peacekeeping 
Missions: The Role of Female Peacekeepers 
and Gender Equality in Contributing Countries”, 
Journal of Peace Research 53 (1) (2016): 100-
115; Sabrina Karim and Kyle Beardsley, Equal 
Opportunity Peacekeeping. Women, Peace, and 
Security in Post-Conflict States (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2017).
30 Stephen Moncrief, “Military Socialization, 
Disciplinary Culture, and Sexual Violence in  
UN Peacekeeping Operations”, Journal of 
Peace Research 54 (5) (2017): 715-30.
31 United Nations General Assembly, Special 
Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation 
and Sexual Abuse: Report of the Secretary 
General, UN doc. A/72/751, 15 February 2018, 2.
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The consequences of these acts, however, have been 
left largely unexplored.
6and resources from efforts to maintain 
peace and security, promote and protect 
human rights, provide humanitarian 
assistance and realise the Sustainable 
Development Goals.”32 This is supported 
by research in Liberia that estimates 
that more than 12,000 women entered 
the transactional sex market who would 
not have done without UNMIL present.33 
The authors acknowledge that the 
association between the growth of the 
transactional sex market and UNMIL’s 
presence could be coincidental, meaning 
that UN personnel present in the country 
did not participate in the transactional 
sex market. However, in their view, highly 
paid UN personnel’s participation in this 
market is beyond doubt. This raises 
concerns not only regarding UNMIL’s 
recent withdrawal in March 2018, which 
left behind a distorted economy in 
which the majority of Monrovia’s young 
women will have been depending to 
some extent on selling sex, but also for 
the majority of other PKOs and the UN’s 
broader peace-building goals, especially in 
regards to gender equality and economic 
development. These findings and 
implications highlight the importance of 
continued data collection and systematic 
analyses to improve our understanding of 
the short- and long-term impact of SEA. 
DATA ON WOMEN AND 
GIRLS IN ARMED GROUPS
Participation
Throughout history the majority of 
combatants have been men, mostly 
young and of lower social status.34 This, 
in combination with gender stereotypes 
about women’s assumed peacefulness, 
has resulted in research largely 
neglecting women’s participation in 
armed groups. In recent years, however, 
systematic research into women’s 
participation in armed groups has grown 
substantially. Specifically, three datasets 
have demonstrated that women are 
actively involved in rebel groups far more 
often than previously acknowledged. 
These datasets open the door for 
research to systematically explore the 
variation in women’s participation, the 
causes, and effects. 
The first dataset includes information on 
166 violent political organisations across 
19 African countries between 1950 and 
2011. Using these data, Jakana Thomas 
and Kanisha Bond illustrate that women 
were active in almost half of all groups 
and that women were combatants 
in almost a third of them.35 Exploring 
organisation-based factors for women’s 
participation, they show that smaller 
groups and groups involved in self-
determination struggles are less likely 
to include women. On the other hand, 
women are more likely to take on combat 
roles in groups that have a positive 
gender ideology. Regardless of their 
role, women’s participation is more likely 
when groups use forcible recruitment or 
specialise in terrorist tactics. 
The second dataset draws on a random 
global sample of 72 rebel groups between 
1990 and 2009. Alexis Henshaw shows 
that women were active participants 
in more than half of these groups, that 
they held combat roles in almost a third 
of them, and that they were part of 
the leadership in more than a quarter 
of the groups.36 In 31 out of the 43 
groups, women participated voluntarily. 
Exploring structural drivers of women’s 
participation, Henshaw finds that women 
are motivated by economic and ethnic 
or religious grievances.37 She also finds 
+
 Three datasets have demonstrated that women are actively 
involved in rebel groups far more often than previously 
acknowledged. These datasets open the door for research to 
systematically explore the variation in women’s participation, 
the causes, and effects.
32 Ibid, 2.
33 Beber et al, “Peacekeeping, Compliance with 
International Norms, and Transactional Sex in 
Monrovia, Liberia”.
34 Joshua S. Goldstein, War and Gender: How 
Gender Shapes the War System and Vice Versa 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
35 Jakana L. Thomas and Kanisha D. Bond, 
“Women’s Participation in Violent Political 
Organizations”, American Political Science 
Review 109 (3) (2015): 488-506.
36 Alexis Leanna Henshaw, “Where Women Rebel: 
Patterns of Women’s Participation in Armed 
Rebel Groups 1990-2008”, International Feminist 
Journal of Politics 18 (1) (2016): 39-60.
37 Alexis Leanna Henshaw, “Why Women Rebel: 
Greed, Grievance, and Women in Armed Rebel 
Groups”, Journal of Global Security Studies 1(3) 
(2016): 204-19.
Study Area Key Findings
Dara Kay Cohen, “Explaining Rape during Civil War.  
Cross-National Evidence (1980-2009)”
SVAC •  Armed groups that recruit by force, through abduction or 
pressganging, use rape to create unit cohesion 
•  Weak states  increased wartime rape by rebel groups
•  Insurgent contraband funding  increased wartime rape by  
rebel groups
Dara Kay Cohen and Ragnhild Nordås, “Do States 
Delegate Shameful Violence to Militias? Patterns of 
Sexual Violence in Recent Armed Conflicts”
SVAC  
and Militias
•  States commit sexual violence as a complement to, not as a 
substitute for, militia violence 
•  Militias recruiting children  higher levels of sexual violence
•  Militias receiving state training  higher levels of sexual violence
Karin Johansson and Mehwish Sarwari, “Sexual 
Violence and Biased Military Interventions in  
Civil Conflict”
SVAC  
and Military 
interventions
   Shifts in the power relations between warring parties increase 
the likelihood of sexual violence
Joakim Kreutz and Magda Cardenas, “Women, Peace 
and Intervention: How the International Community 
Responds to Sexual Violence in Civil Conflict”
SVAC and 
Peacekeeping
   Both the United Nations and regional organisations deploy 
peacekeepers to conflicts with high prevalence of sexual violence
Karin Johansson and Lisa Hultman, “Responding  
to Wartime Sexual Violence: UN Peacekeeping and  
the Protection Agenda”
SVAC and 
Peacekeeping
•  Reports of sexual violence increase the likelihood of a 
peacekeeping operation
•  Depending on sources, contradictory findings for whether 
the UN responds differently to sexual violence perpetrated by 
states and non-state actors respectively
Lisa Hultman and Karin Johansson,  
“UN Peacekeeping and Protection  
from  Sexual Violence”
SVAC and 
Peacekeeping
•  Ability of peacekeepers to reduce sexual violence in general  
is weak  
•  Stronger police contingents have an advantage over  
other missions 
•  When actors exercise control, the number of peacekeepers 
is associated with a lower risk of sexual violence for both 
governments and rebels 
Robert U. Nagel, “Talking to the Shameless?  
Sexual Violence and Conflict Management in 
Intrastate Conflicts”
SVAC and 
Mediation
   Mediation onset in civil wars is more likely when rebels are 
reported to perpetrate sexual violence
Tiffany Chu and Jessica Maves Braithwaite,  
“The Effect of Sexual Violence on Negotiated 
Outcomes in Civil Conflicts”
SVAC  
and Conflict 
outcomes
   When both sides perpetrate sexual violence during the  
conflict they are more likely to end the conflict via a  
negotiated agreement
Bernd Beber, Michael Gilligan, Jenny Guardado,  
and Sabrina Karim, “Peacekeeping, Compliance  
with International Norms and Transactional Sex  
in Monrovia, Liberia”
SEA    Estimates that more than half of 18 to 32-year old women in 
greater Monrovia have engaged in transactional sex and that 
most of them (more than 75 per cent) have done so with  
UN personnel
Ragnhild Nordås and Siri C A Rustad,  
“Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by  
Peacekeepers: Understanding Variation”
SEA •  Greater size of the troop contingent  higher levels of SEA 
reporting 
•  Missions in countries with higher levels of economic 
development  lower levels of SEA reporting
•  Missions following conflicts in which there was extensive sexual 
violence  higher levels of SEA reporting 
•  Mission mandates explicitly mention women  higher levels of 
SEA reporting 
•  Mission takes place after 2005  higher levels of SEA reporting
Sabrina Karim and Kyle Beardsley, “Explaining Sexual 
Exploitation and Abuse in Peacekeeping Missions:  
The Role of Female Peacekeepers and Gender 
Equality in Contributing Countries”
SEA •  Greater share of women deployed Greater share of women 
deployed  lower levels of SEA reporting
•  Higher proportions of troops from countries with better records 
on gender equality  lower levels of SEA reporting lower levels 
of SEA reporting
•  Higher proportions of troops from countries with better records 
on gender equality  lower levels of SEA reporting 
Stephen Moncrief, “Military Socialization,  
Disciplinary Culture, and Sexual Violence in  
UN Peacekeeping Operations”
SEA    Higher numbers of non-sexual discipline offences  higher 
levels of reported SEA
Table I. Overview of studies on SVAC and SEA
8that women did not participate because 
it presented an opportunity for personal 
gain. Women also did not participate 
because a rebel movement had a platform 
of supporting women’s rights, but some 
cases rather suggest that women’s 
participation shifted the movement’s 
platform. In sum, her findings challenge 
the importance of selective incentives 
and the desire for political participation 
as important motivations for women’s 
rebel group participation.
The third dataset improves on these two 
existing datasets by including a larger 
sample of rebel groups and providing 
prevalence estimates of women as 
combatants.38 Similar to the first dataset, 
Reed Wood and Jakana Thomas focus 
on organisational factors in exploring 
potential explanations for the variation 
in female fighters’ presence and 
prevalence. They find that the underlying 
group ideology is an important factor 
associated with the number of female 
combatants. A Marxist-inspired “leftist” 
ideology is associated with higher numbers 
of female fighters, while an Islamist 
ideology shows the opposite relationship. 
Nationalist ideologies do not show any 
significant relationship in either direction. 
In addition to these datasets on women in 
rebel and violent political organisations, 
there are two datasets on girls in armed 
groups. The first dataset identifies 54 
countries in which girls were present in 
either governmental or non-state armed 
forces between 1990 and 2002.39 In 36 
of these countries, girl soldiers were 
involved in armed conflict. In some cases, 
such as Angola, Sierra Leone, El Salvador, 
Uganda, and Ethiopia, girls constituted 
30 per cent to 40 per cent of all child 
soldiers. The second, recently released 
dataset– Girl Child Soldiering Dataset 
(G-CSDS) – improves on this existing 
dataset by extending the time period 
to cover 1989 to 2013.40 In their global 
sample of 321 rebel groups, Roos Haer 
and Tobias Böhmelt find that about half 
of these groups included girl soldiers (48 
per cent). Girl soldiers fulfilled supporting 
roles in the majority of these 154 groups; 
however, in 57 groups girls also took on 
combatant roles. Similar to the findings 
regarding women’s participation in violent 
political organisations, the size of the 
group matters: smaller groups are less 
likely to recruit girl soldiers. They also find 
that the more active rebel groups there 
are in a country the less likely a group is 
to recruit girls, and that levels of economic 
development have a negative relationship 
with the recruitment of girls — i.e., higher 
levels of economic development are 
associated with a lower likelihood of girl 
soldiering. Furthermore, they find that 
the longer a conflict is ongoing, the more 
likely it is that a group recruits girl soldiers. 
The results also suggest that there are 
important differences between girl fighters 
and those in support roles. In focusing 
on women and girls as agents of political 
violence and as members of non-state 
armed groups, these datasets and results 
are important contributions to a feminist 
WPS research agenda, which seeks to both 
move away from traditional state-centrism 
in international relations and recognise 
women’s diverse roles in peace and conflict. 
A shared shortcoming of all these 
datasets is that they are largely time-
invariant.41 Put differently, while they tell 
us that women and/or girls were active 
in a group, they do not tell us when the 
women/girls entered the group and how 
long they remained in the group. This 
+
 In focusing on women and girls as agents of political violence 
and as members of non-state armed groups, these datasets 
and results are important contributions to a feminist WPS 
research agenda, which seeks to both move away from 
traditional state-centrism in international relations and 
recognise women’s diverse roles in peace and conflict.
38 Reed M. Wood and Jakana L. Thomas, 
“Women on the Frontline: Rebel Group 
Ideology and Women’s Participation in Violent 
Rebellion”, Journal of Peace Research 54 (1) 
(2017): 31-46.
39 Dyan Mazurana et al, “Girls in Fighting Forces 
and Groups: Their Recruitment, Participation, 
Demobilization, and Reintegration”, Peace and 
Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology 8 (2) 
(2002): 97-123.
40 Roos Haer and Tobias Böhmelt, “Girl Soldiering 
in Rebel Groups, 1989–2013: Introducing a 
New Dataset”, Journal of Peace Research 55 
(3) (May 2018): 395-403.
41 For the G-CSDS as well as Wood and Thomas’s 
dataset the unit of analysis is conflict-dyad-
period, which allows for variation between 
conflict periods, but not within. 
is primarily a result of the difficulties of 
collecting detailed, yearly information on 
non-state actors42 –a common challenge 
of datasets on non-state actors–and by 
no means diminishes the value of these 
datasets. Increasing our understanding 
of the prevalence of women’s and girls’ 
participation in armed groups is vital to 
help scholars and policy-makers identify 
the underlying causes and consequences 
of women and girls’ participation. These 
datasets shed light on previously neglected 
aspects of both armed groups and 
conflicts, enabling researchers to highlight 
and examine the influence of women and 
girls during and after conflict, as well as 
to evaluate policies and implementation 
programmes, for example demobilisation, 
disarmament, re-integration, reconstruction, 
and peace-building programs. 
So what do these datasets tell us about 
the effects of women’s/girls’ participation 
in armed groups? Considering how recent 
these datasets are, it is not surprising that 
there are many questions that are yet to be 
explored. One question that has received 
some attention is to what extent women’s 
participation influences wartime rape. 
Scholars and international organisations 
claim that women’s participation in armed 
groups might reduce the prevalence 
of conflict-related sexual violence.43 
However, Meredith Loken’s systematic 
analysis of women’s participation in 
armed groups and wartime rape shows 
that there is no significant association.44 
Put differently, whether women 
participate or not does not influence an 
armed group’s propensity to commit 
wartime rape. This is just one example 
of how promising these datasets are in 
terms of facilitating further research and 
informing policy-making.  
Women in national militaries
Shifting the focus from armed groups to 
national militaries, it becomes apparent 
that, to the author’s knowledge, there is 
no existing global dataset that bundles 
national data on women in militaries. 
The data that do exist are largely on 
Western militaries. For example, Helena 
Carreiras’s book Gender and the Military: 
Women in the Armed Forces of Western 
Democracies has an accompanying 
dataset45 however, as the title implies, 
it is limited in its geographical scope. A 
further problem is that the dataset is 
unfortunately outdated as it only covers 
the time period between 1986/7 and 
2000. A more recent dataset covers 
the years 2001 to 2011.46 This dataset 
draws on the annual reports of NATO’s 
Committee on Gender Perspectives, 
which are compiled based on data from 
national militaries. These contain overall 
percentages of female military personnel 
as well as information on service (army, 
air force, navy) and rank. The inclusion 
of information on the rank of women is 
particularly valuable because it helps to 
address the issue of “merely counting 
women”, which might hide hierarchical 
power structures within national militaries. 
An obvious shortcoming regarding 
these datasets on women in national 
militaries is the limited temporal and 
geographical scope. Researchers 
interested in women’s participation in 
countries outside of NATO have to collect 
relevant data individually, country by 
country. To do so, they need to contact 
countries’ individual departments or 
defence ministries. However, this comes 
with another challenge: countries do not 
keep very good data regarding women in 
the armed forces. There are substantial 
+
 Put differently, whether women participate or not does 
not influence an armed group’s propensity to commit 
wartime rape. This is just one example of how promising 
these datasets are in terms of facilitating further research 
and informing policy-making.
42 David E Cunningham, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, 
and Idean Salehyan, “Non-State Actors in Civil 
Wars: A New Dataset”, Conflict Management 
and Peace Science 30 (5) (2013): 516-31.
43 Elisabeth Jean Wood, “Sexual Violence during 
War: Toward an Understanding of Variation,” 
in Order, Conflict, and Violence, ed. Stathis 
N. Kalyvas, Ian Shapiro, and Tarek Masoud 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2008), 321–51.
44 Meredith Loken, “Rethinking Rape: The Role of 
Women in Wartime Violence”, Security Studies 
26 (1) (2, 2017): 60–92.
45 Helena Carreiras, Gender and the Military: 
Women in the Armed Forces of Western 
Democracies (London: Routledge, 2006).
46 Anita Schjølset, “Data on Women’s Participation 
in NATO Forces and Operations”, International 
Interactions 39 (4) (2013): 575–87.
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Table II. Overview of datasets on women and girls in armed groups
Study Scope Key Findings
Jakana Thomas and Kanisha Bond,  
“Women’s Participation in Violent  
Political Organizations”
Sample of 166 
organisations across  
19 African countries 
between 1950 and 2011
•  Women were active in almost half of all groups and 
combatants in almost a third of them
•  Smaller groups and groups involved in self-determination 
struggles  women’s participation less likely
•  Groups that have a positive gender ideology  women more 
likely to take on combat roles
•  Forcible recruitment or specialisation in terrorist tactics  
women’s participation more likely
Alexis Henshaw, “Where Women  
Rebel. Patterns of Women’s  
Participation in Armed Rebel Groups”
Random global sample  
of 72 rebel groups 
between 1990 and 2009
•  Women were active participants in more than half of these 
groups, held combat roles in almost a third of them, and were 
part of the leadership in more than a quarter
•  In 31 out of the 43 groups, women participated voluntarily
•  Women motivated by economic and ethnic or religious 
grievances
Reed Wood and Jakana Thomas, “Women 
on the Frontline: Rebel Group Ideology  
and Women’s Participation in Violent 
Rebellion”
Global sample of 211 
rebel organisations active 
between 1979 and 2009
•  Underlying group ideology is an important factor associated 
with the number of female combatants
•  Marxist-inspired “leftist” ideology  higher numbers of  
female fighters
•  Islamist ideology  lower number of female fighters 
•  Nationalist ideologies do not show any significant relationship 
with women’s participation in either direction 
Dyan Mazurana, Susan McKay, Kristopher 
Carlson and Janel Kasper, “Girls in 
Fighting Forces and Groups: Their 
Recruitment, Participation, Demobilization, 
and Reintegration”
Government and non- 
state actors in 54 
countries between  
1990 and 2002
•  In 36 of these countries, girl soldiers were involved in armed 
conflict 
•  In cases such as Angola, Sierra Leone, El Salvador, Uganda,  
and Ethiopia girls constituted 30 per cent to 40 per cent of  
all child soldiers
Roos Haer and Tobias Böhmelt,  
“Girl Soldiering in Rebel Groups,  
1989-2013: Introducing a New Dataset”
Global sample of 321  
rebel groups between 
1989 and 2013
•  In the majority of these 154 groups, girl soldiers fulfil 
supporting roles 
•  In 57 groups girls also take on combatant roles
•  Smaller groups  less likely to recruit girl soldiers
•  More active rebel groups in a country  less likely a group 
recruits girls
•  Higher levels of economic development  less likely a group 
recruits girls 
•  Longer conflicts  more likely a group recruits girls
gaps in data coverage even within NATO 
countries. For example, there are seven 
years in the 1980s for which France 
simply does not have data on women 
in the military because they decided 
not to disaggregate the data. Norway 
had a similar issue; they only decided it 
was important to disaggregate data on 
soldiers by sex about 20 years ago. 
The WomanStats project lists a number of 
variables of interest in regards to women’s 
participation in national militaries, such 
as EWCMS-LAW-1 (Are women allowed 
to serve in the military? What about in 
combat? Compare to military service 
requirements for men? Are women the 
targets of recruitment as well as men?) 
and EWCMS-DATA-1 (How common are 
women in the military? How many hold 
leadership positions?). However, neither 
provide an easily accessible dataset that 
would allow for a systematic analysis of 
women’s participation in national militaries.
Although the lack of datasets on women in 
national militaries is generally unfortunate, 
this also presents plenty of opportunities 
for researchers. A global dataset providing 
estimates of women’s prevalence in the 
different branches of national militaries, 
even if limited in temporal scope, would 
open up a completely new quantitative 
research agenda. 
DATA ON THE WOMEN, 
PEACE AND SECURITY 
AGENDA
In 2000, the UN Security Council adopted 
resolution 1325, an important, formal 
commitment to the WPS agenda. UNSCR 
1325 called for women’s participation 
in peace and security governance, the 
protection of women, and prevention of 
violence. Furthermore, it formalised the 
overarching aim of gender mainstreaming. 
A number of subsequent resolutions differed 
in their emphasis on these four aspects, 
reflecting changes in understanding and 
scope of the WPS agenda.47 
Gender mainstreaming
To advance gender mainstreaming, 
the Secretary-General’s report on WPS 
in October 2004 urged all UN member 
states to develop comprehensive action 
plans. A National Action Plan (NAP) 
outlines the policies or the course of 
action that a country plans to adopt 
to fulfill objectives and attain goals 
pertaining to the WPS agenda. The first 
country to develop a NAP was Denmark 
in 2005, followed by Norway, Sweden, 
and the UK the next year. As of March 
2018, 74 countries have adopted NAPs.48 
What do we know about these NAPs and 
how they shape policies?
In 2014, a study examined 40 of the 42 
NAPs in existence at the time.49 They 
found stark geographical patterns. 
Twenty-two of the 42 countries were in 
Western Europe, and at the time of the 
study, not a single country in the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA) region had 
adopted a NAP.50 West Africa presents a 
small cluster of countries that adopted 
NAPs while only a few countries in Central-
Latin America and the Asia-Pacific region 
adopted NAPs. Hand in hand with this 
geographical pattern, the authors also 
find a pattern of where NAPs are located 
in governmental structures. Countries 
in the Euro-America block locate the 
responsibility for NAPs in foreign 
ministries. This placement indicates an 
outward-looking understanding of the 
WPS agenda in which foreign aid should 
+
 Although the lack of datasets on women in national 
militaries is generally unfortunate, this also presents plenty 
of opportunities for researchers. A global dataset providing 
estimates of women’s prevalence in the different branches of 
national militaries, even if limited in temporal scope, would 
open up a completely new quantitative research agenda. 
47 These are UNSCRs 1820, 1888, 1889, 1960, 2106, 
2122, 2242; see also Barbara Miller, Milad Pournik, 
and Aisling Swaine, “Women in Peace and Security 
through United Nations Security Resolution 1325: 
Literature Review, Content Analysis of National 
Action Plans, and Implementation”, Institute for 
Global and International Studies Working Paper 
Series 13 (9) (2014).
48 PeaceWomen, “Member States”, PeaceWomen, 
http://www.peacewomen.org/member-states.
49 Miller, Pournik, and Swaine, “Women in Peace 
and Security through United Nations Security 
Resolution 1325”; see also Laura J. Shepherd, 
“Making War Safe for Women? National Action 
Plans and the Militarisation of the Women, 
Peace and Security Agenda”, International 
Political Science Review 37 (3) (2016): 324-35.
50 Since then Iraq, Palestine, and Jordan have 
adopted NAPs. 
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foster the four pillars of UNSCR 1325 in 
countries with lower levels of economic 
development and/or which are affected 
by conflict. In contrast, NAPs in developing 
and/or post-conflict countries are inward-
looking, focusing on supporting domestic 
peace processes and post-conflict 
reconstruction. In light of the substantial 
increase of NAPs since the release of this 
initial study, a new systematic analysis 
of NAPs, their governmental locations, 
geographical patterns and contents, would 
offer valuable insights in how countries’ 
understanding of NAPs has developed. 
Besides spurring NAPs, UNSCR 
1325 also set gender mainstreaming 
efforts within the UN into motion. For 
example, UNSCR 1325 also includes 
an explicit call for integrating a gender 
perspective into UN PKOs and for 
increasing women’s participation in all 
post-conflict reconstruction efforts. So 
what do we know about the UN efforts 
in this regard? Anne-Kathrin Kreft has 
examined this question by analysing 
the extent of gender mainstreaming 
in UN peacekeeping mandates.51 She 
provides a systematic analysis of an 
original dataset covering all 71 UN PKOs 
from 1948 until 2014, in which she 
illustrates that gender mainstreaming 
of mandates is associated with high 
levels of conflict-related sexual violence. 
In line with this, research shows the UN 
Security Council is more likely to address 
conflicts in a resolution when there 
are reports of conflict-related sexual 
violence.52 These studies suggest that 
the international community is responsive 
to sexual violence, which is a narrow, 
but very visibly gendered aspect of 
conflicts, and that the gendering of UN 
PKO mandates is not necessarily guided 
by the universalist norms of women’s 
participation as advocated for in the WPS 
agenda. This raises the question of how 
much progress there has been in terms 
of women’s participation.
Participation
A growing number of states have 
appointed women to lead their 
defence ministries. Nonetheless, men 
continue to dominate this space. A 
comprehensive cross-national dataset 
on the appointment of defence ministers 
covering the post–Cold War era sheds 
light on the factors that lead to men’s 
dominance and helps us understand 
women’s access to the defence ministry.53 
Tiffany Barnes and Diana O’Brien show 
that when traditional beliefs about the 
masculinity of the position shape the 
government’s perception of the defense 
ministry, women remain excluded from 
it. The factors that contribute to such a 
masculine understanding are involvement 
in fatal disputes, large military expenditure, 
and dictatorial governments. On the other 
hand, when societal expectations of 
women in politics change, women also 
emerge as defence ministers, for example 
in states with female chief executives and 
women in the legislature. Similarly, when 
the defence ministry is conceived of in less 
traditional and bellicose ways, for example 
in countries associated with PKOs, women 
are also more likely to lead it.
Besides the defence ministry, the foreign 
ministry presents another traditionally 
male-dominated realm. A recent cross-
sectional dataset of ambassador 
appointments finds that 85 per cent of 
the world’s ambassadors are men.54 
The dataset contains 6,990 ambassador 
appointments made by the 50 highest 
ranking countries in terms of GDP in 
2014. On average a country appoints 
96 ambassadors, with a minimum of 
33 (Singapore) and a maximum of 165 
(China). Examining men’s and women’s 
placement, Ann Towns and Birgitta 
Niklasson find a gendered pattern of post 
allocation: men are more likely to serve 
as ambassadors in prestigious locations 
associated with higher economic 
and military power, while women are 
more likely to serve as ambassadors 
51 Anne-Kathrin Kreft, “The Gender Mainstreaming 
Gap: Security Council Resolution 1325 and 
UN Peacekeeping Mandates”, International 
Peacekeeping 24, (1) (2017): 132-58.
52 Michelle Benson and Theodora-Ismene 
Gizelis, “UN Resolutions and Sexual Violence 
in Civil Wars”, paper presented at the Annual 
Conference of the International Studies 
Association, Baltimore (2017).
53 Tiffany D. Barnes and Diana Z. O’Brien, 
“Defending the Realm: The Appointment 
of Female Defense Ministers Worldwide”, 
American Journal of Political Science 62 (2) 
(2018): 355-68.
54 Ann Towns and Birgitta Niklasson, “Gender, 
International Status, and Ambassador 
Appointments”, Foreign Policy Analysis 13 (3) 
(2016): 521-40.
in less high-status countries. Put 
differently, even after accounting for the 
general overrepresentation of men as 
ambassadors, men are more likely than 
women to serve in countries that are 
deemed important based on their military 
expenditure and economic output. 
Considering these imbalances in defence 
and foreign ministries and the frequent 
sidelining of civil society organisations, it 
is not surprising that one of the core WPS 
aims–increasing women’s participation in 
peace processes –remains out of reach. 
A frequently cited UN Women study found 
that in 31 major peace processes in the 
period between 1992 and 2011 women 
constituted only 9 per cent of negotiating 
teams and only 4 per cent of signatories 
of peace agreements.55 This is regrettable 
for a number of reasons. First, from a 
normative perspective, women should 
be part of any comprehensive peace 
process. Second, there now is reliable 
evidence that women’s participation in 
peace processes is associated with more 
durable agreements.56 Put differently, 
through collaboration across diverse 
groups, women’s involvement in peace 
processes improves the quality of 
peace agreements and facilitates their 
implementation. UNSCR 1325, however, 
did not seem to have the desired positive 
effect in terms of increasing women’s 
participation in peace processes. Since 
its adoption, there has been no significant 
increase in the number of women as 
signatories of peace agreements. 
 
The absence of women at the negotiating 
table corresponds to an absence of 
references to women in peace agreements. 
A recently released dataset examining 
1,518 peace agreements between 1990 
and 2015 finds that only 315 (21 per 
cent) contain explicit text references to 
women and/or gender.57 An early analysis 
of a subsample of 1,168 agreements 
found an encouraging temporal pattern: 
before the passage of UNSCR 1325 only 
11 per cent of agreements had included 
references to women, whereas after 
UNSCR 1325 27 per cent of agreements 
included such references.58 The dataset 
also codes references to men and boys, 
sexual orientation and family, enabling 
researchers to look beyond just women 
and take gender seriously in their analysis. 
To date, this dataset offers the best 
opportunity to systematically examine 
previous claims about the role and effect 
of gendering peace agreements. 
At the same time, it is important to 
remember that women’s presence and text 
references to women are not a magical 
solution. It is far more complicated than 
“add women and stir”. For example, Kara 
Ellerby’s study of women’s substantive 
representation in peace processes shows 
that women’s presence does not solve 
issues of meaningful participation.59 She 
emphasises the need for three factors: an 
explicit women’s agenda, access to the 
peace process, and advocacy within the 
process. These datasets on the gendered 
dimensions of peace agreements 
as well as women’s participation in 
defence and foreign ministries present 
invaluable opportunities for systematic 
analysis that can serve to improve these 
three dimensions.
Prevention and protection
Research shows that the UN Security 
Council interprets the WPS pillars of 
protection and prevention very narrowly. 
Although all conflicts are inherently 
gendered,60 the UN primarily focuses 
on sexual violence. Research using the 
SVAC dataset shows that the UN Security 
Council is more likely to pass resolution 
on a conflict if there are reports of high 
levels of sexual violence, that gender 
mainstreaming in UN PKO mandates is 
more likely in conflicts involving sexual 
violence, and that UN PKOs are more 
likely to deploy to conflicts in which sexual 
violence is reported. Peacekeepers, 
however, only have a limited mitigating 
effect on the perpetration of sexual 
55 Pablo Castillo Diaz and Simon Tordjman, 
Women’s Participation in Peace Negotiations: 
Connections between Presence and Influence, 
2nd ed., UN Women Peace and Security 
Sourcebook (New York: UN Women, n.d.).
56 Jana Krause, Werner Krause, and Piia Bränfors, 
“Women’s Participation in Peace Negotiations 
and the Durability of Peace”, International 
Interactions, forthcoming.
57 “PA-X, Peace Agreements Database and 
Access Tool, Version 1,” Political Settlements 
Research Programme, 2017,  
www.peaceagreements.org
58 Christine Bell, “Text and Context:  
Evaluating Peace Agreements for Their “Gender 
Perspective”, Political Settlements Research 
Paper (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh, 2015).
59 Kara Ellerby, “A Seat at the Table Is Not 
Enough: Understanding Women’s Substantive 
Representation in Peace Processes”, 
Peacebuilding 4 (2) (2016): 136-50.
60 Laura Sjoberg, Gendering Global Conflict.  
Toward a Feminist Theory of War (New York NY: 
Columbia University Press, 2013); R. Charli 
Carpenter, “Women, Children and Other 
Vulnerable Groups”: Gender, Strategic Frames 
and the Protection of Civilians as a 
Transnational Issue”, International Studies 
Quarterly 49 (2) (2005): 295-334.
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Table III. Overview of studies on gender mainstreaming, participation, protection and prevention
Study Area Key Findings
Barbara Miller, Milad Pournik, and 
Aisling Swaine, “Women in Peace and 
Security through United Nations Security 
Resolution 1325: Literature Review, 
Content Analysis of National Action Plans, 
and Implementation” 
Gender mainstreaming 
and National Action Plans
•  42 countries had adopted a NAP by 2014 (current number is 74)
•  22 of the 42 countries were in Western Europe and at the time 
of the study, not a single country in the MENA region  
had adopted a NAP
•  Countries in the Euro-America block locate the responsibility  
for NAPs in foreign ministries
•  Developing and/or post-conflict countries place NAPs in interior 
ministries to support domestic peace processes and post-conflict 
reconstruction
Anne-Kathrin Kreft, “The Gender 
Mainstreaming Gap: Security  
Council Resolution 1325 and UN 
Peacekeeping Mandates” 
Gender mainstreaming 
and UN Security Council 
Resolutions
•  Original dataset covering all 71 UN PKOs from 1948 until 2014
•  High levels of conflict-related sexual violence  gender 
mainstreaming in UN peacekeeping mandates more likely
Michelle Benson and Theodora-Ismene 
Gizelis, “UN Resolutions and Sexual 
Violence in Civil Wars”
Gender mainstreaming 
and UN Security Council 
Resolutions
•  Reports of conflict-related sexual violence  UN Security 
Council more likely to address conflict in a resolution 
Tiffany D Barnes and Diana Z O’Brien, 
“Defending the Realm: The Appointment  
of Female Defense Ministers Worldwide”
Defence ministries •  Strong traditional beliefs about the masculinity of the position  
women less likely to lead defence ministry
•  Country’s involvement in fatal disputes  women less likely to 
lead defence ministry
•  Large military expenditure  women less likely to lead 
defence ministry
•  Dictatorial governments  women less likely to lead  
defence ministry
•  Countries associated with PKOs women more likely to lead 
defence ministry
Ann Towns and Birgitta Niklasson, 
“Gender, International Status, and 
Ambassador Appointments”
Diplomacy •  85 per cent of the world’s ambassadors are men
•  Gendered pattern of post allocation
•  Men more likely to serve as ambassadors in prestigious 
locations associated with higher economic and military power
•  Women are more likely to serve as ambassadors in less  
high-status countries
Pablo Castillo Diaz and Simon Tordjman, 
“Women’s Participation in Peace 
Negotiations: Connections between 
Presence and Influence”
Peace processes •  In 31 major peace processes in the period between 1992 and 
2011 women constituted only 9 per cent of negotiating teams 
and only 4 per cent of signatories of peace agreements
Jana Krause, Werner Krause, and Piia 
Bränfors, “Women’s Participation in Peace 
Negotiations and the Durability of Peace”
Peace processes •  Peace agreements signed by female delegates  durable peace
•  Agreements signed by women  higher number of peace 
agreement provisions aimed at political reform, and higher 
implementation rates for provisions
Michelle Benson and Theodora-Ismene 
Gizelis, “Mandating Protection: The  
Impact of UN Peacekeeping Operations  
on Sexual Violence in Civil Wars” 
Peacekeeping and 
Prevention of SVAC
•  Inclusion of police forces in UN missions  mitigating effect 
on levels of sexual violence
violence.61 Another forthcoming study 
shows that it is primarily the inclusion 
of police forces in UN missions that 
have a mitigating effect on levels of 
sexual violence.62 This further underlines 
the importance of multidimensional and 
robust mandates for UN peacekeeping 
missions. 
Peacekeeping plays a central role in 
protection and prevention efforts. This 
in turn raises questions about the extent 
to which the WPS agenda has influenced 
women’s participation in such operations. 
The short answer is: since the adoption 
of UNSCR 1325, PKOs have seen an 
increase in the numbers of female 
peacekeepers, a process often referred 
to as gender balancing. However, we 
know more than this. Examining women’s 
participation in the military contingents 
of UN PKOs, Sabrina Karim and Kyle 
Beardsley find that female peacekeepers 
are primarily sent to environments that 
are deemed less hostile.63 Instead of 
sending female peacekeepers to conflicts 
which would warrant the deployment 
of women — i.e. conflicts in which there 
are high levels of violence against local 
women — women are deployed to areas 
where there is little risk. This suggests 
that the UN is missing an opportunity 
for more meaningful gender balancing, 
which could help alleviate local women’s 
security concerns. 
Limitations 
The collection of (conflict) data in 
general faces a number of obstacles 
including access, accuracy, and reliability. 
Cross-national comparisons further 
face the difficulties of finding data that 
are indeed comparable and also cover 
enough countries to draw meaningful 
generalisations and inferences. This 
often means relying on a limited number 
of English speaking sources, which are 
incapable of fully capturing the nuances of 
local contexts. In addition, cross-national 
data often do not adequately reflect sub-
national, regional, urban-rural, economic, 
or ethnic differences. Accentuating or 
brushing over these differences bestows 
states and international organisations 
with great arbitrating powers as 
interlocutors and gatekeepers who 
provide or deny access, and often makes 
data collection politically motivated 
and biased.64 They decide what counts, 
what is counted, and what is omitted. 
Hence data collection and publication are 
political acts. Combined, these factors 
mean that “incomplete data can be the 
result of resource limitations, deficient 
collection mechanisms, or active 
attempts by governments to hide their 
discriminatory or depraved behavior.”65 
Conflict-related sexual violence magnifies 
these challenges because it often is 
specifically used to shame and silence 
survivors.66 Research on sexual violence 
is limited by the “tip of the iceberg” 
phenomenon, i.e. low level of reporting 
despite high prevalence. This renders 
an accurate count of incidents of sexual 
violence virtually impossible. The SVAC 
dataset attempts to attenuate this 
problem by providing four prevalence 
categories: 0 – no reports of sexual 
violence; 1– some reports of sexual 
violence (up to 25 reported incidents); 
2– sexual violence is reported as 
widespread (25– 999 reported incidents); 
3– sexual violence is reported as massive, 
systematic, “terror tactic” or “tool of war” 
(1,000 or more reported incidents). 
However, this risks conflating prevalence 
(“massive”) with intent (“terror tactic”), 
which further highlights the political 
nature of data collection and coding. 
The silencing of survivors has further 
implications in addition to the difficulty 
of accurately estimating the prevalence 
of sexual violence. Data collection often 
fails to capture the intersectional nature 
of (sexual) violence, which occurs along 
dimensions of age, ethnicity, religion, and 
class. The original SVAC dataset seeks to 
mitigate these issues by explicitly coding 
61 Benson and Gizelis, “UN Resolutions and 
Sexual Violence in Civil Wars”; Kreft, “The 
Gender Mainstreaming Gap”; Johansson and 
Hultman, “UN Peacekeeping and Protection 
from Sexual Violence”.
62 Michelle Benson and Theodora-Ismene Gizelis, 
“Mandating Protection: The Impact of UN 
Peacekeeping Operations on Sexual Violence 
in Civil Wars”, paper presented at the Annual 
Conference of the International Studies 
Association, San Francisco (2018).
63 Sabrina Karim and Kyle Beardsley, “Female 
Peacekeepers and Gender Balancing: Token 
Gestures or Informed Policymaking?”, 
International Interactions 39 (4) (2013): 461-88.
64 Clair Apodaca, “Overcoming Obstacles in 
Quantitative Feminist Research”, Politics & 
Gender 5 (3) (2009), 419.
65 Apodaca, 423.
66 Sara E. Davies and Jacqui True, “The Politics 
of Counting and Reporting Conflict-Related 
Sexual and Gender-Based Violence: The Case 
of Myanmar,” International Feminist Journal of 
Politics 19, no. 1 (January 2, 2017): 4-21.
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disaggregated information on ethnicity, 
nationality, religion, age, location, timing, 
and type of sexual violence. However, the 
dataset itself is limited by its sources, 
meaning reports by Human Rights 
Watch, Amnesty International, or the 
US State Department frequently do not 
contain these details, or may omit them 
to protect survivors from retaliation. 
The SVAC coding manual, which is 
publicly available, is in many ways 
exemplary in its clarity and rigor. Its 
stringent application ensures the greatest 
possible comparability across countries 
and years. This, however, admittedly 
also has a downside. If a report does not 
clearly identify who (perpetrator) did what 
(form of sexual violence) when (year) 
with a clear connection to a conflict listed 
by the Uppsala Conflict database, then it 
is not coded, which can lead to incorrect 
estimates. For example, an Amnesty 
International special report might include 
details of sexualised torture of detainees 
by a government covering a five or ten year 
period. Although the separate interview 
excerpts in the report suggest widespread 
or even systematic patterns, the individual 
survivors’ quotes that fulfil all coding 
criteria might only warrant a coding of 
“1” (some reports of sexual violence). In 
other cases there might be a shift over 
time in how much attention the individual 
reporting organisation pays to sexual 
violence. This is particularly relevant for 
countries and conflicts in which there are 
multiple non-state actors such as India, 
Myanmar, and Colombia. For example, 
in the past the US State Department 
frequently referred to different Marxist-
inspired communist groups as guerrilla 
groups without distinguishing which 
group perpetrated what kind of violence.
All of the mentioned data collections efforts 
share these limitations in some form. Yet 
these challenges and shortcomings do 
not mean we should stop systematic data 
collection and analysis. Rather it highlights 
the importance for feminist quantitative 
research to remember that any data 
collected on conflict, sexual violence, 
and/or women’s lives and experiences 
in general are at best incomplete and at 
worst politically motivated. Accordingly, 
ethical and responsible use of such 
data requires honest reflection of these 
political implications and any statistical 
findings must be interpreted cautiously. 
CONCLUSION
Future research
These various datasets open the door 
for a multitude of potential research 
projects. Importantly, these datasets 
promise to help bridge the divide between 
feminist theorising and systematic data 
analysis. Feminist theories offer new 
perspectives to mainstream conflict 
research, which needs new theoretical 
concepts, approaches, and arguments, 
if it wants to evolve and remain relevant. 
Similarly, these datasets offer feminist 
scholars an opportunity to apply their 
rich theoretical arguments using different 
methodologies. The resulting synergies 
have the potential to shape policy-making 
and have a wide impact.
These datasets highlight, however, not 
just what we know, but also what we do not 
know. We know very little about the long-
term consequences of conflict-related 
sexual violence, exploitation, and abuse. 
Does this type of violence affect citizens 
differently than less overtly gendered 
+
 The silencing of survivors has further implications in 
addition to the difficulty of accurately estimating 
the prevalence of sexual violence. Data collection often fails 
to capture the intersectional nature of (sexual) violence, 
which occurs along dimensions of age, ethnicity, religion, 
and class.
violence? How do citizens perceive 
national and international authorities, 
if their respective representatives are 
involved in SEA at home or abroad? We 
also know very little about women’s 
numbers and roles in national armies 
and how their service affects them and 
society at large. Another question is: 
How do female ambassadors shape 
foreign policy? When do women as 
ambassadors also conduct feminist 
foreign policy? Or, put differently, how do 
they shape diplomacy both in terms of 
style and content? Are agreements that 
contain text references to women more or 
less successful in ending conflicts? If they 
end conflicts, are they more durable, less 
durable, no different to other agreements? 
These, and many other questions, wait 
to be examined whether it is by scholars 
using these existing datasets or compiling 
their own. 
 
Challenges
This short overview of the data landscape 
regarding, gender, women, peace and 
security highlights the recent progress 
in data quality and availability. It shows 
great potential, yet at the same time many 
aspects of the WPS agenda and peace 
and conflict more generally continue to 
lack systematic data. This is particularly 
unfortunate because it prevents a broader 
inclusion in mainstream research and 
limits its policy impact. The continued 
collection of sex-disaggregated data is 
crucial. However, recent funding cuts put 
the future of both research and policy 
programs at risk.67
The primary challenge, therefore, is 
maintaining the political and institutional 
support for research projects focused 
on gender and the WPS agenda. Yearly 
sex-disaggregated data are fundamental 
to all of these (and any future) data 
projects. Only if researchers, practitioners, 
and policy-makers have access to sex-
disaggregated data, can they conduct 
detailed and robust analyses that 
can inform and shape policies. 
Accordingly, governments and international 
organisations need to bolster, rather 
than cut, their funding for such research 
programs, while limiting their influence 
on the data collection and dissemination 
process. 
The inherently gendered nature of 
conflicts requires a comprehensive 
engagement with the different gendered 
aspects and consequences of conflict. 
Systematic data collection and analysis 
is fundamental to such a comprehensive 
engagement. From addressing sexual 
violence, exploitation, and abuse to 
understanding women’s impact as 
diplomats, feminist scholarship can and 
should inform systematic analyses to 
provide new directions for research and 
policy-making. To move both feminist 
and mainstream conflict research 
forward it is imperative to build strong 
connections and harmonise these 
different approaches. In bringing them 
together it is important to remember that 
“feminist-inspired research is merely an 
analytical tool. Feminist principles apply 
to the act of research, the questions 
asked, and the data collected”.68 Non-
participation in mainstream quantitative 
research does not make it less prevalent, 
but adhering to feminist principles and 
implementing them consciously has the 
potential to substantially improve if not 
transform it.
67 Rebecca Ratcliffe, “Alarm Over Cuts to Hague-
Jolie Plan to End Sexual Violence in War”,  
The Guardian, 4 December 2018, https://www.
theguardian.com/global-development/2018/
apr/12/litmus-test-looms-william-hague-
angelina-jolie-scheme-to-end-sexual-violence-
in-war-preventing-sexual-violence-initiative; 
Jessica Anderson, “Trump Wants to Divert 
Aid Away from Women and the Environment”, 
Washington Post - Monkey Cage, 5 December 
2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/05/12/trump-
wants-to-divert-aid-away-from-women-and-the-
environment
68 Apodaca, “Overcoming Obstacles in 
Quantitative Feminist Research”, 419.
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+ 
BEST PRACTICES IN COLLECTING AND INTERPRETING DATA
1. When using others’ data:
• Has it gone through a peer-review 
process? 
• Take a look at the data; if possible 
do a random spot check of one or 
two cases.
• Check the coding manual– 
are funding, data sources, collection, 
and decision making processes clear, 
justified,  and logical?
• Contact authors if you have 
questions about collection and/or 
coding procedures. 
• Be clear in how you manipulate 
or modify the data for your own 
research purposes. 
2. When collecting your  
    own data:
• Consult “Conflict Consortium 
Standards & Best Practices for 
Observational Data” and “Best 
practices in the collection of conflict 
data”69
• Choose your data sources carefully.
• Be consistent to avoid missing or 
biasing your data.
• Be transparent about all stages of 
the process including funding, data 
sources, collection, coding, and 
analysis. 
• Provide a clear coding manual that 
accurately reflects collection and 
coding procedures.
• Provide inter-coder reliability statistics, 
discuss examples of difficult (or 
ambiguous) cases, and provide 
confidence estimates for individual 
data points.
• Make your data publicly available 
for others. 
3. When interpreting data:
• Acknowledge and reflect on the 
inherently political nature of both 
data collection and analysis.
• Reflect on what data are missing 
and what this implies. 
• Keep in mind that incomplete data 
can still be representative of actual 
patterns.
• Acknowledge inherent uncertainty 
associated with data and 
the associated difficulties in 
differentiating between increased 
prevalence and increased reporting.
• Openly address data problems and 
your efforts to mitigate them. 
69 Christian Davenport and Will H. Moore, “Conflict Consortium Standards & Best Practices for Observational Data”, 7 April 2015,  
https://conflictconsortium.weebly.com/standards--best-practices.html ; Idean Salehyan, “Best Practices in the Collection of Conflict Data”,  
Journal of Peace Research 52 (1) (2015): 105-9.
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